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vertising of said economical grade of service has a tendency
to, or does deceive, defraud or mislead the members of the
public.'' Having found no violation or threatened violation
of the Unfair Practices Act the trial court properly withheld
the requested relief.
The judgments are affirmed.
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
'rRAYNOR, J.-I dissent for the reasons set forth in the
dissenting opinion in State Board of Dry Cleaners v. ThriftD-Lnx Cleaners, ante, p. 449 [254 P.2d 29].
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied April 2,
1953. Gibson, C.•J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22323.
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GLADYS D. SMITH, Appellant, v. IRA V. SMITH,
Respondent.
[1] Divorce-Disposition of Property-Effect of Agreement of
Parties.-Where interlocutory divorce decree purported to approve entire property settlement of parties, in which wife
waived all right to any payments for support and maintenance,
but court awarded her nominal alimony in accordance with
her request, the decree may only be interpreted as approving that part of the agreement dividing the property and
not as approving the waiver of alimony.
[2] !d.-Disposition of Property-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-Where an interlocutory divorce decree purporting to approve a property settlement agreement in its entirety has
become final, and husband, in a proceeding for modification of
such decree, seeks collaterally to attack the provision award[1] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce and Separation, § 180 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Divorce, § 223; [3] Divorce,
§219; [5] Divorce, §§72(2), 204; [6] Judgments, §328(2); [7]
Divorce, § 216(1).
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ing alimony, the question is not whether the trial court erred
in granting relief inconsistent with the property settlement
agreement but only whether it had jurisdiction to do so.
[3] !d.-Disposition of Property-Jurisdiction.-Where the property rights of the parties are put in issue, the court in a
divorce action has jurisdiction to determine them.
[4] !d.-Disposition of Property-Effect of Agreement of Parties.
-The court in a divorce action has jurisdiction to determine
whether a property settlement agreement is equitable and
should be enforced, and to award alimony in a proper case.
( Civ. Code, § 139.)
[5] !d.-Pleading-Property Rights and Alimony.-Questions as
to whether a property settlement agreement is equitable and
should be enforced in a divorce action and whether wife
is entitled to alimony are raised by her pleadings asking that
approval be withheld from the provision of such agreement
respecting alimony, thereby in effect attacking the validity
of that agreement; by her request that the remaining provisions be approved, this being tantamount to a claim that she
is entitled in any event to the property the agreement provides she should have; and by a prayer for nominal alimony,
this in effect asking the court to exercise its power to reserve
jurisdiction to award substantial alimony in the future if
changed circumstances should justify it.
[6] Judgments- Collateral Attack- Insufficiency of Pleading.The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action does
not render a default judgment vulnerable to collateral attack; it is sufficient if it apprises defendant of the nature
of plaintiff's demand.
[7] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance.An order refusing modification of an interlocutory divorce
decree awarding the wife nominal alimony will not be affirmed on the ground of avoidance of a multiplicity of suits
in that any amounts which wife might receive if decree were
modified would be in breach of a property settlement agreement, where wife attacked provision of agreement relating
to alimony in her complaint, and the court, by granting her
the alimony prayed for, determined that such provision was
not binding on her.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County denying motion for modification of an interlocutory judgment. Mildred L. Lillie, Judge. Reversed.
[3] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1944 Rev.), Divorce and Separation, § 167 et seq.
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Jesse Blattel for Appellant.
Erb, French & Picone and John L. Stennett for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On January 21, 1947, plaintiff secured an
interlocutory decree of divorce from defendant by default
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The parties had previously
executed a property settlement agreement in which plaintiff
waived all right to any payments for support and maintenance. She alleged in her complaint that "the parties have
heretofore concluded a property settlement agreement, which
plaintiff confirms and asks the Court to approve, save and
excepting any provision therein respecting payment of alimony. She is asking that an award of at least token alimony
be made at this time.'' She prayed ''for a judgment of
divorce against the defendant ; that the custody of the minor
child of the parties be awarded to her; that the property
settlement be confirmed, excepting provision for alimony;
that she be awarded nominal alimony, and that she have
such other and further relief as may be equitable.'' The
interlocutory decree provided in part that "the property
settlement agreement filed herein is hereby approved and
the defendant is ordered and directed to carry out the terms
thereof," and "IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant
pay to plaintiff the sum of $1.00 per month for her support
commencing February 1, 1947, and continue each month
thereafter until further order of Court." In November,
1951, plaintiff sought to have the support award increased
to $100 per month on the ground of changed circumstances.
The trial court refused to hear any evidence on the issue of
changed circumstances and entered its order refusing modification of the interlocutory decree on the ground that the
decree approved the property settlement agreement containing a provision waiving alimony. Plaintiff has appealed.
She contends that the interlocutory decree clearly provided
for an award of alimony and that under Civil Code section
139 the trial court has jurisdiction to modify that award.
Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the property
settlement agreement, having been approved in the interlocutory decree, now stands in the way of any award inconsistent with its terms.
[1] Although the interlocutory decree purports to approve
the property settlement agreement in its entirety, it is clear
when it is read in the light of the complaint that it did not
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do so. Plaintiff expressly requested that approval be withheld from the provision waiving support and prayed that
nominal alimony be awarded. Such an award was made, and
accordingly, the decree may only be interpreted as approving
that part of the agreement dividing the property and not
as approving the waiver of alimony.
Helying on Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d
265], defendant contends that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction to modify the property settlement agreement by
providing for relief inconsistent with its terms. In that case,
on an appeal from a decree similar to the one here, we said,
"It is true that public poliey requires the protection of
the wife and that in a divorce action the court in its diseretion may award her necessary alimony. ( Civ. Code, § 139.)
Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial court
to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to the
division of their property. The court cannot, as was attempted
in the present case, purport to approve the agreement and
at the same time order payment of support and maintenance
contrary to its terms." (29 Cal.2d at 627.) Since in that
case the plaintiff made no showing that the agreement was
inequitable or obtained by improper means, it was held that
the agreement was binding on the parties and the court.
[2] In the present case, however, defendant did not appeal
from the interlocutory decree. That decree is now final, and
in this proeeeding defendant seeks collaterally to attack the
provision awarding alimony. Accordingly, we are not concerned with whether the court erred in granting relief inconsistent with the property settlement agreement but only
with whether it had jurisdiction to do so.
[3] When the property rights of the parties are put in
issue, the court in a divorce action has jurisdiction to determine them. (Httber v. Huber, 27 Cal.2d 784, 793 [167 P.2d
708] .) [4] Similarly, it has jurisdiction to determine whether
a property settlement agreement is equitable and should be
enforced (Adams v. Adams, snpra, 29 Ca1.2d 621, 628),
and to award alimony in a proper case. ( Civ. Code, § 139.)
[5] All of these questions were raised by the pleadings in
this ease, and the relief granted was in aceorc1 with the
prayer of the eomplaint. By asking that approval be withheld
from the provision of the agreement respeeting alimony,
plaintiff in effeet attaeked the validity of that agreement.
On the other hand, her request that the remaining provisions
be approved was tantamount to a elaim that she was entitled
in any event to the property the agreement provided she
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should have. In addition, by praying for nominal alimony,
she in effect asked the court to exercise its power to reserve
jurisdiction to award substantial alimony in the future if
changed circumstances should justify such an award. (See,
McClure v. McClure, 4 Cal.2d 356, 359 [49 P.2d 584, 100
A.L.R. 1257] ; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Oal.2d 833, 841 [136
P.2d 1); Wilson v. Superior Comt, 31 Cal.2d 458, 464 [189
P.2d 266]; Gebhardt v. Gebhardt, 69 Cal.App.2d 723, 727-728
[160 P.2d 177); Sot~le v. Soule, 4 Cal.App. 97, 101 [87 P.
205] .)
It may be conceded that she did not allege sufficient facts
to show the invalidity of the agreement, or to show that regardless of its terms, she was entitled to the award of the
property she received. [6] 'l'he failure of a complaint to
state a cause of action, however, does not render a default
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack. It is sufficient if
it apprises the defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's
demand. (Trans-Pacific T. Co. v. Patsy F. & R. Co., 189
Cal. 509, 513-514 [209 P. 357]; Christerson v. French, 180
Cal. 523, 525 [182 P. 27] ; In re James, 99 Cal. 374, 376-377
[33 P. 1122, 37 Am.St.Hep. 60] ; Svetina, v. Burelli, 87 Cal.
App.2d 707, 709 [197 P.2d 562]; Henderson v. Henderson,
85 Ca1.App.2d 476, 479 [193 P.2d 135] ; see, also, Wells
Fargo & Co. v. City etc. of San Franc£sco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 40,
43, 44 [152 P.2d 625] ; Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328, 335
[100 P.2d 1045] .) Plaintiff's complaint met this test.
[7] Defendant finally contends that the order refusing
modification should be affirmed to avoid multiplicity of suits.
He argues that any amounts plaintiff might receive if the
decree were modified would be in breach of their agreement,
and that accordingly, he could recover them back as damages
from plaintiff. This argument assumes the validity of the
provision of the separation agreement waiving alimony. As
pointed out above, however, plaintiff attacked that provision
in her complaint, and the court, by gTanting her the alimony
prayed for, determined that it was not binding upon her.
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, .T.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that the token alimony provision of $1.00
per month in this case is in harmony with the provisions
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of section 139 of the Civil Code. That section provides that
"Where a divorce is granted for an offense of the husband,
the court may compel him to provide for the maintenance
of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable
allowance to the wife for her support, . . . having regard to
the circumstances of the parties respectively. . . . " (Emphasis added.) By no stretch of the imagination can it be
said that the sum of $1.00 per month could be sufficient
for the maintenance of the minor child here, or for the
support of the wife. Alimony is granted for the express
purpose of enabling the wife to maintain the children and
support herself ( Ci v. Code, § 139). It is, therefore, in a
different category than the $1.00 nominal consideration found
in contracts and deeds to property. The legal effect is also
entirely different. The legal effect of an alimony provision
in a decree of divorce gives the trial court continuing jurisdiction to modify the sum awarded as the need of the one
to whom the alimony was awarded increases or decreases,
or the ability of the one paying the alimony changes. It is
most apparent here that the sum of $1.00 per month was
not sufficient to support anyone and that there is quite a
difference between $1.00 and the $100 per month which the
trial court is being asked now to allow the wife. It occurs
to me that if the majority opinion is sound, had the trial
court made a provision for one cent a month alimony the
wife could later request that the one cent be increased to
$1,000 or $10,000 per month depending upon her ability to
show that the defendant had, by some means, come into a
large sum of money because, under the conditions prevailing
here, it would not be necessary for her to show that her condition had changed since it cannot possibly be said that one
cent, or one dollar per month had ever been adequate support
for her. (Becker v. Becker, 64 Cal.App.2d 239 [148 P.2d
381] ; 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 35 et seq.) To contend, seriously, that
the provision for payment of $1.00 per month alimony was
intended as support for the wife is absurd and ridiculous.
Not only that, but in view of the express provision in the
property settlement agreement whereby the wife waived all
rig·ht to alimony, the $1.00 token alimony provision in the
decree has the effect of perpetrating a fraud on the husband
who, at the time, was not represented by counsel. The only
purpose in inserting the provision for token alimony was to
enable the trial court to retain jurisdiction and, in view of
the waiver provision, is a fraud upon the husband.
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In my opinion, the majority holding in this case is in conflict
with Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621 [177 P.2d 265]. We
said there (p. 625) "The third category includes contracts in
which the wife waives all support and maintenance, or all
support and maintenance except as provided in the agreement, in consideration of receiving a more favorable division
of the community property. The court cannot add a provision
for alimony to such contracts without changing basically the
agreement of the parties as to the divis'ion of their property.
We are confronted with such a situation in the present case.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court did not make a new
property settlement agreement for the parties but approved
the agreement except for the provision in which she waived all
support and maintenance . ... The contract before the trial
court in the present case was clearly one that attempted to
settle the property rights of the parties. It contained a waiver
of all other payments in consideration of her receipt of the
major portion of the community property, and that waiver
was inseparable from the remainder of the division of property. A waiver under such conditions is not void per se."
(Emphasis added.) It was further held that "It is true that
public policy requires the protection of the wife and that in
a divorce action the court in its discretion may award her
necessary alimony. ( Civ. Code, § 139.) Such discretion, however, does not empower the trial court to modify valid agreements of the parties pertaining to the division of their property. The court cannot, as was attempted in the present case,
purport to approve the agreement and at the same time order
payment of support and maintenance contrary to its terrn,s."
(Emphasis added.) We concluded that since nothing was shown
to indicate that the agreement entered into between the parties
was inequitable the parties are bound by the agreement. It is
conceded in the majority opinion that plaintiff did not attack
the terms of the property settlement as inequitable and there
was no finding to that effect. There was not even a finding
that the terms thereof waiving alimony was disapproved. It
appears to me that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award
alimony in the face of the clear provision which it approved
in the property settlement agreement waiving it. In the Adams
case, supra, 29 Cal.2d 621, we said the trial court was not
empowered to modify valid agreements of the parties.
What does that mean except that the trial court does not
have jurisdiction to do so f Or are we to use the word ''jurisdiction'' in one case and the word ''empower'' in another and
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]payr the attorneys to guess just what we do mean? That it
is a guess is apparent from the briefs in this case because the
plaintiff conceded that the opinion of the District Court of
Appeals * ( Cal.App.) 248 P.2d 777 which affirmed the trial
court is correct "If the A dams case holds that a judgment rendered contrary to the rule [set forth above] is void or in excess
of its jurisdiction" but that "If this court by the Adams and
subsequent cases merely intended to say that a judgment
awarding alimony contrary to the Adams case is subject to
attack on a motion for a new trial or by appeal then the District Court of Appeal is in error." (Emphasis added.) The
majority of this court now adds to the confusion in holding
that the plaintiff really meant to attack that portion of the
agreement waiving alimony and that she requested the balance
thereof to be approved and ''In addition she asked for
alimony.'' As I have heretofore pointed out, the sum of $1.00
per month cannot reasonably be said to constitute alimony
within the meaning of the code section ( Civ. Code, § 139) and
was only inserted in the decree so that continuing jurisdiction
might be retained by the trial court. In so doing, the trial court
perpetrated a fraud upon the husband in which the majority
of this court now joins.
The holding of the majority here is also contrary to the
decision of this court in Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520 [196
P.2d 909] in which this court held that where a property
settlement agreement declaring that the wife releases the husband from ''all claims whatsoever'' for support or attorney's
fees has been determined to be valid in a prior action, the
trial court in a divorce action has no power to make an award
of alimony pendente lite and suit money contrary to the
provisions of such agreement. Here there is no question as to
the validity of the agreement as it was prepared by the wife's
attorney. She submitted it for the approval of the court at
the trial of her divorce action and the same was approved by
the court at her request. I can see no distinction in the legal
problem involved in the two cases. In the Patton case this
court held that in a case where by a valid property settlement agreement, the wife waived all claim to alimony, the
court had no power to make an award of alimony to her in a
subsequent action for divorce. Here there can be no question in
regard to the validity of the agreement. At least its validity is
not questioned by the wife, and since if was approved by the

*A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on December 4, 1952.
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trial court in a divorce action, its validity is beyond question.
Therefore, in the language of the Patton case the court had
"no power" to make an award of alimony in her favor. If the
court had "no power" to make an award of alimony in her
favor, the spurious award of $1.00 in the interlocutory decree
was obviously void.
Furthermore, it should follow that if the court had no
power to make an award of alimony in favor of the wife because of the valid property settlement agreement in which she
waived all her claim for support, it would then have been
an idle act for the trial court to take evidence in support of
her application for an increase in the amount of alimony
awarded her by the interlocutory decree, as the court was
likewise powerless to increase an award which it originally
had no power to make. Therefore, even if we concede that
the award of $1.00 per month alimony to the wife was mere
error and not jurisdictional (which I do not) the trial court
was certainly not required to take up the time of the court
listening to evidence of changed conditions when it knew in
advance that it was powerless to grant the relief demanded.
I would therefore affirm the judgment.
SCHAUER, J.-I think that we should abide by the authorities cited by Justice Carter. It seems to me that it is
neither logical nor legally sound nor otherwise becoming for
this court to give the dignity of its support to what appears
to be essentially a subterfuge whereby a contract-the terms
of which admittedly the court could not alter-is held to have
been both approved and disapproved; and whereby, further,
it is held in effect that a party to a court-approved contract
may take all the benefits thereof, keep them, and continue
to receive them, but disavow at will the obligations which
constituted the consideration for making the contract in the
first place.
I, too, would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

